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Archive for May 11th, 2012

Leishmaniasis vaccine trial underway

Posted by African Press International on May 11, 2012

Leishmaniasis patient in Afghanistan

BANGKOK,  – A vaccine against one of the most neglected yet fatal tropical diseases is being tested for the first time in a clinical trial in India and the US. After malaria, leishmaniasis is the second largest parasitic killer, and the visceral form is the most deadly.

“Visceral leishmaniasis (VL) kills 50,000 persons per year, 70 percent of them children. It can be treated but the costs are too high… at hundreds of US dollars per person,” said Dr Franco Piazza at the Infectious Disease Research Institute (IDRI), a Seattle-based NGO that developed the vaccine with funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

VL, also called kala-azar or black fever, infects an estimated half million persons or more annually. It is found most commonly in India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Brazil and Sudan.

The leishmaniasis group of diseases is transmitted by infected sand flies, which carry a parasite that attacks the liver, spleen and bone marrow. Left untreated, VL is almost always fatal, said Philippe Desjeux, a specialist in the infection at the San Francisco-based non-profit OneWorld Health.

OneWorld Health is leading the US-funded part of the clinical trial testing IDRI’s vaccine. The other part of trial is led by Gennova Pharmaceuticals – a Pune-based Indian company to which IDRI has transferred its technology – in collaboration with the Banaras Hindu University in Varanasi.

“We have just opened a formulation centre [research and production facility] for vaccines against neglected diseases in Pune, said Sanjay Singh, the chief executive officer of Gennova. “If the vaccine passes all the tests, producing it in India will make it affordable to all the people who are affected by VL.”

The infection is one of more than a dozen grouped as “neglected tropical diseases”, occurring mostly in tropical countries where they kill an estimated half million people annually and for which few treatments exist due to lack of funding for research and treatment.

A total of 72 volunteers are participating in the trial, but scientists say it will take years of testing to roll out an affordable vaccine to the 200 million people globally at risk of VL infection.

VL is most fatal in South Sudan, where poverty and conflict make even relatively inexpensive methods like treated bed nets to protect people from infected sand flies hard to implement.

The WHO has warned that VL is spreading to previously unaffected countries due to co-infections of HIV and leishmaniasis, while the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has said climate change can also spur the spread of the disease.


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Ugandan AMISOM battle group 8 soldiers about to deploy to Mogadishu

Posted by African Press International on May 11, 2012

Ugandan AMISOM battle group 8 soldiers about to deploy to Mogadishu

JOHANNESBURG,  – Africa’s crises are both honing and stalling the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) of the African Union (AU) – a quick reaction force that could eventually number about 30,000 troops to be deployed in a range of scenarios, from peacekeeping to direct military intervention.

Originally intended to become operational in 2010, the deadline for the ASF has been reset for 2015; but despite the delay, the ASF is becoming increasingly woven into the operating procedures of current AU security operations.

The ASF “is very much a work in progress”, African Union Commissioner of Peace and Security Ramtane Lamamra told IRIN, but “at the political level there is a strong support for it under the guiding principle of bringing about African solutions to African problems.”

Once up and running, the ASF will be based on five regional blocs each supplying about 5,000 troops: the Southern African Development Community (SADC) force (SADCBRIG), the Eastern Africa Standby force (EASBRIG), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) force (ECOBRIG), the North African Regional Capability (NARC), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) force (ECCASBRIG), also known as the Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC).

The regional forces are not a standing army like national forces. As the AU Peace and Security Council protocol of the ASF stipulates, they “shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.”

The ASF is the legacy and logic of the Constitutive Act of the AU adopted in 2000, the successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In a complete break from the OAU, which had advocated non-interference in member states, the Act gave the AU both the right to intervene in a crisis, and an obligation to do so “in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.

Lamamra said the ASF “Implies the immediate availability of the instruments [of intervention and prevention] to be translated into concrete deeds… when they relate to some kind of enforcing decisions of the legitimate organs of the African Union, such as cases of unconstitutional changes of government… or armed rebellion, such as the terrorist situation in northern Mali.”

''I believe the learning curve for the standby force is AMISOM. We have to deliver on the lessons learned in the AMISOM process''

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was held up as an example of what the ASF could be. “I believe the learning curve for the standby force is AMISOM. We have to deliver on the lessons learned in the AMISOM process – five years of effective presence on the ground under quite challenging circumstances,” Lamamra said.

“The lesson of AMISOM is that Africans should be ready to make sacrifices, and Uganda has wonderfully shown that they are ready to make sacrifices for the common good of Africa.” Uganda has supplied most of the AU troops supporting the Somali government against jihadist rebels.

The AU has deployed 14 staff officers to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, “in the first ever deployment of ASF elements,” El Gassim Wane, AU Commission director of peace and security, told IRIN.

A field exercise – Amani II, following the Amani I mapping exercise in 2010 – is being planned for 2014 and three of the five brigades are expected to take participate.

Article 4 (h)

Lamamra was confident that by 2015 all of the ASF’s regional brigades – with the probable exception of NARC, owing to the disruptions of the Arab Spring – would be operational and able to fulfil all the criteria of AU’s Article 4 (h), which influenced the international development of the UN Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.

There are six scenarios in Article 4 (h). The lowest rung is the attachment of a regional military advisor to a political mission; then an AU regional observer deployed within a UN mission; followed by a stand-alone AU regional observer mission; and deployment of a regional peacekeeping force under the auspices of a Chapter VI mandate, all within a timeframe of 30 days or less. Scenario five is a multidimensional AU peacekeeping force deployed within 90 days, and scenario six relates to “grave circumstances”, such as genocide, and deployment within 14 days.

Lamamra said the timeline of 14 days for level-six intervention should be reassessed to about seven days. “For instance, resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council was adopted on 17 March and the actual military operation started on 19th March – 14 days would have been too much in terms of protecting civilians.”

In a 2010 paper, The Role and Place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture, Solomon Dersso, a senior researcher at the Addis Ababa office of the Institute for Security Studies, a Pretoria-based think-tank, notes that “Article 4 (h) not only creates the legal basis for intervention but also imposes an obligation on the AU to intervene to prevent or stop the perpetration of such heinous international crimes anywhere on the continent.”

However, implementation of R2P rests with the Security Council, while the imposition of Article 4 (h) resides with the AU and does not require the Security Council’s blessing.

Scenario six of Article 4 (h) has yet to be used by the AU and Dersso told IRIN he “sincerely doubted” the article would be invoked in the short term against member states, as “it would deprive the AU of any leverage it has over a target government,” and the AU has already “shied away” from implementing the article in Darfur.

He expected the ASF to be close to being able to comply with Article 4 (h) level-five scenarios by 2015, but the development of regional forces was proceeding at different paces.

The two-speed progress of the regional brigades – in which ECOWAS and SADC are recognised as the furthest along the path – is not just a consequence of the two regional blocs housing the continent’s economic power houses of Nigeria and South Africa, AU Commission director of peace and security El Gassim Wane told IRIN.

''Intrinsically, in most of these situations what is needed is a political response, and there is a temptation that if you have a standby force to use it because you have a military capacity''

“ECOWAS and SADC have made tremendous progress, EAS Brigade too, while NARC in the north was lagging behind, but then started speeding up, but the Libyan crisis meant progress had to stop,” he said.

“Money may play a role, but money alone cannot explain that. ECOWAS and SADC focused early on conflict and security issues, so had a competitive advantage in the very beginning. Experience, length of involvement in peace and security issues, have certainly played a key role,” Wane said.

Alex de Waal, executive director of the World Peace Foundation, told IRIN the availability of a standby force could cloud judgment.

“Intrinsically, in most of these situations what is needed is a political response, and there is a temptation that if you have a standby force to use it because you have a military capacity… And my concern over something like Mali would be that the military option runs the danger of getting the AU into a Somalia-type situation, where the use of military force five or six years ago by the US and Ethiopia very seriously rebounded. But having said that – yes, in a situation where there is a need for some sort of peacekeeping deployment in the context of a political initiative, it makes sense.”

Alternatives to the ASF?

Analysts have questioned whether 30,000 troops would be sufficient to deal with the continent’s crises, and 2012 has illustrated that such concerns are valid. A range of crises this year erupted within the space of a few weeks, from the uneasy relationship between South Sudan and Sudan deteriorating into border skirmishing, to coup d’etats in Mali and Guinea-Bissau.

Wane said the establishment of the ASF did not necessarily mean it would be the only security option at the AU’s disposal, and the four-country operation against Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army, (LRA) a rebel movement that started in northern Uganda, could be considered as a useful model for the future.

“It’s not an ASF operation per se, as ASF has its own processes, and it was not really conceived as an ASF operation – it was conceived as an ad hoc, very flexible arrangement to enhance effectiveness to deal with the LRA once and for all. It’s a very flexible and creative way of dealing with a specific security issue… Who knows? We may replicate it elsewhere, where there is a security problem,” he said.

The force ranged against the LRA – comprising soldiers from the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Uganda – has fought against the LRA in past, but is set apart, as it operates under the aegis of the AU.

Abou Moussa, the Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), based in Libreville, Gabon, told IRIN: “The specific nature of this deployment [against the LRA] is termed ‘authorised’ as compared to ‘mandated’.”

“Under authorised deployment, each country provides for the needs and requirements of their respective troops without the AU’s contribution. This is extremely important, as this can be considered as their own contribution towards the determination to put an end to Kony’s actions. It is very costly. However, the AU covers the needs of staff officers – some 30 of them posted to the various coordinating centres.”

The AU task force has three operational centres, located in Dungu, DRC, at Obo in CAR, and Nzara in South Sudan, with its headquarters in Yambio, South Sudan.

“The Regional Coordination Initiative [against the LRA] means more subtle changes in the way the operation is run, with representatives of all four countries involved in the command structure in Yambio,” which sidesteps the politically sensitive issue of the DRC’s refusal to host Ugandan forces on its soil, Ned Dalby, a central Africa analyst for the International Crisis Group, a conflict resolution NGO, told IRIN.

In July 2005, the International Criminal Court indicted Kony and four of his commanders, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, Raska Lukwiya and Vincent Otti, for a variety of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Lukwiya and Otti have subsequently been killed, but the arrest warrants for the remaining three remain outstanding. The LRA has not been active in Uganda since 2006.


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Will the Cease-fire Hold in Sudan Border Regions? A Timeline of

Posted by African Press International on May 11, 2012

  • By Eric Reeves, Smith College, Northampton, MA  01063 (USA)

If history is any guide, Khartoum’s agreement to the cease-fire terms
dictated by the May 2, 2012 UN Security Council Resolution, supported by
the African Union, will prove meaningless; follow-up agreements will be
signed, and they too will prove meaningless. The National Islamic
Front/ National Congress Party regime has never abided by any agreement with a Sudanese party—and never will, certainly not without much more vigorous international pressure on Khartoum, pressure that is not disabled by a factitious “even-handedness,” a moral equivalency between the NIF/NCP *
génocidaires *and the struggling leadership in Juba.



That we should be asking with such uncertainty about the fate of a
cease-fire agreement that may hold the key to whether Sudan and South Sudan
resume war is not surprising.  At countless junctures in the past year and
a half, the Khartoum regime has been encouraged to think that it can,
without real consequence, abrogate or renounce agreements made with various Sudanese and South Sudanese parties.  The military seizure of Abyei
represents only the most conspicuous example.  Present uncertainty, then,
is not surprising; what is surprising is how rapidly the international
community, and too often news reporting, has lost sight of the historical
context out of which our uncertainty grows.  Since *fall of 2010* there
have been a great many agreements abandoned by Khartoum—indeed, if we are even slightly scrupulous, *all* agreements the regime has made have been
abrogated, renounced, violated, or simply ignored.

This in turn continues a pattern that stretches back to the beginning of
the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime following
its *military coup in June 1989*—a coup, we should recall, deliberately timed to abort the most promising chance for a North/South peace agreement
since*independence in 1956 *.  Both the Umma of Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Democratic Unionist Party seemed prepared to reach an agreement with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army.

Instead, unfathomably destructive war continued, in which more than 2
million people were killed, and as many as 5 million displaced.  The human
suffering, overwhelmingly by Southern and Nuba civilians, defies all
description.  And yet, despite the demands of a UN Security Council
resolution on Wednesday,* May 2*, Khartoum violated the cease-fire on
Friday, *May 4* according to reports from Juba: Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)
used long-range artillery to target Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA) positions within the Tishwin, Lalop and Panakuach area of Unity
State.  Indeed, on the *very day following the UNSC cease-fire demand*,
backing the African Union peace mediation effort, Juba reported that twelve
bombs again targeted Lalop, critically wounding a child and mother.  There
are unconfirmed but highly plausible reports of artillery fire into these
same areas on Saturday, *May 5*.  The cease-fire has already been violated
by Khartoum.

We should note that the UN Security Council threw its support squarely
behind the AU effort despite the fact that the Southern leadership has long
been distinctly unhappy with chief AU mediator Thabo Mbeki (as were
Darfuris before Southerners).  Even so, it was Juba that first and eagerly
embraced the cease-fire proposal and continued AU mediation, even before
the Security Council resolution; it was Khartoum that accepted the AU
framework only “in principle”—<>a qualification behind which massive violence is likely to be justified.

We have only to look at comments coming from the Foreign Ministry to see
the implications of Khartoum’s “acceptance in principle,” and its claims
that the SPLA is still “occupying” parts of northern Sudan.  Encouraged by
the hasty and deeply misguided international effort to describe SPLA
seizure of Heglig as an “invasion” of the North, Khartoum is now making a
series of commensurately misleading claims:

“[The Foreign Ministry cited] ‘continuous aggression and attack from South
Sudan’s army on Sudanese soil until today.’ ‘The government of Sudan hopes
the other party will commit to stop the hostilities completely and withdraw
its troops from the disputed areas so as not to put SAF (Sudanese Armed
Forces) in a situation where it has to defend itself,’ the ministry added.”
(Agence France-Presse [Khartoum], May 4, 2012>

Here we see the dangerous result of South Sudan becoming independent
without strong international commitment and assistance in resolving border
disputes with Khartoum and overseeing final border demarcation.  We can
expect to see this excuse for military actions on Khartoum’s part for the
foreseeable future, even as some of the “disputed” areas are disputed only
on the basis of regime intransigence (see, for example, the Rift Valley
Institute analysis of the Kafia Kingi area> in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, where the* January 1, 1956 border* conspicuously puts the enclave in South Sudan). Without clearly delineated and demarcated borders, the opportunities for Khartoum to initiate military actions self-described as “self-defense” will be many and continuous. In turn, the grim and dispiriting lessons of Abyei have certainly not been lost on Juba.

*Yet again, the international community focuses on only one issue in Sudan*

Arguably the most dangerous part of this uneasy “cease-fire” is that it
diverts international attention away from the massive humanitarian crises
the regime has engineered in other parts of Sudan, including the Nuba
Mountains of South Kordofan, Blue Nile, the refugee camps for people who
have fled from conflict in these regions (more than 100,000 in Upper Nile;
likely more than 40,000 in Unity; and perhaps 40,000 in Ethiopia)—and of
course Darfur. Relentlessly suffering, and increasingly invisibly, the
people of Darfur have been betrayed repeatedly by the international
community, most recently and destructively in the form of the widely
despised Doha Peace Agreement (*July 2011*) (see *Appendix 1 *to* Part
* for a bibliography of recent reports on humanitarian and security
conditions in Darfur).  As Darfur was sacrificed on the altar of CPA completion in *2004*, at the very height of the genocide—and beyond—so it is again the victim of diplomatic tunnel vision.

Despite increasingly desperate calls from humanitarian organizations,
especially those working on food, water, and sanitation, many of these
humanitarian efforts remain under-funded and without adequate
resources. More dangerously, there is still no access to the Nuba Mountains
or displaced persons in Blue Nile.  Although Juba accepted a joint
UN/African Union/Arab League proposal for humanitarian access to all in
need on *February 9*—three months ago—Khartoum has recently declared
that it is still studying this multilateral proposal, which it again welcomes “in principle.”  The clear effort is to wait out the remainder of the dry season, and offer limited access only once the rains have begun (any week now), making delivery inordinately more difficult.

One measure of how little access there is to these desperate regions is the
continually recycled figure of “417,000 displaced by fighting in South
Kordofan and Blue Nile.”  This figure was first promulgated by the UN in
early* December 2011* (see a Reuters
 of *December 13, 2011*).  That the figure has not changed in *five
months*—it continues to be regularly cited in a range of dispatches and reports, without any acknowledgement of its original date—is a measure of how little we know about the scale of the catastrophe that is unfolding,
largely invisibly; substantial anecdotal reports, however, from a wide
range of observers in the Nuba make clear that this number almost certainly
vastly understates.  That the UN is not in a position to update this figure —only the relentlessly increasing number of refugees pouring into Upper Nile and Unity States (South Sudan) and Ethiopia—should be a scandal. Instead, the figure is uncritically re-cycled.

Attention remains diverted as well from Abyei, where we are approaching the
one-year anniversary of Khartoum’s military seizure of the contested region, in violation of the *Abyei Protocol* and the *2009 ruling by the PCA
*.  More than 100,000 Dinka Ngok who were forced to flee Abyei to Warrap
and other Southern states are still unable to return, and confront grim
humanitarian conditions.  There is no evident pressure on Khartoum to
withdraw its forces from Abyei, despite a *June 20, 2011* commitment to do
so with deployment of an Ethiopian peacekeeping force under UN auspices.  Indeed, Khartoum still refuses to negotiate in good faith a Status of Forces Agreement with the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA).  The international community, taking its cue from the U.S., seems content to see the dream of self-determination for the “residents” of Abyei, promised by the CPA, slowly wither away.

*The need for historical context*

No assessment of prospects for the current cease-fire agreement, such as it
is, can possibly be meaningful without taking account of the Khartoum
regime’s *23 years* of relentless abjuring, reneging, renouncing, ignoring,
and denial of agreements it has signed or committed to.  That it continues
to receive international diplomatic credit for these agreements—despite
relentlessly consistent bad faith—of course only encourages the regime to
sign more agreements, agreements that it has no intention of abiding by.

This promiscuous agreement-making and -signing is part of what energizes
the deeply misguided “moral equivalence” that has stalked Sudan diplomacy
for well over a decade.  It is the illusion that the political, diplomatic,
and finally moral equities of Southerners and the Khartoum regime are
somehow equivalent when they clearly are not. 

This is the same illusion that leads U.S. special envoy Princeton Lyman to oppose regime change in Khartoum, and at the same time to declare his confidence in the regime’s ability to “carry out reform via constitutional democratic measured.” Once Khartoum has been conceded this much, it is no surprise that the results are the very opposite of those Lyman professes to believe possible under this tyrannical regime.

With such a perspective dominant within the international community, we can
do no more at present than survey recent and more distant history: the chances that this cease-fire agreement is more likely to hold than Khartoum’s commitment to previous agreements can be calculated only on the basis of previous abrogations.

The present time-line focuses in *Part 1 <> * on those agreements Khartoum has made and/or violated in the first five months of *2012. *It extends the time-line running through December 31, 2011 <>, which appears here—in revised form—as *Part 2>.
 Part 2* focuses on events leading up to and including the *May 2011*military
seizure of Abyei, which abrogated the agreement represented by the Abyei
Protocol of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (*2005*), as had the earlier
denial of a self-determination referendum to the people “resident” in Abyei, as defined geographically by the *2009 *PCA ruling.  The timeline continues through Khartoum’s military assaults on Southern Kordofan (*June 5, 2011*) and Blue Nile (*September 1, 2011*).

[Significant violations of agreements, signed or committed to, are highlighted by *§.  *All emphases, *bold* and *italics*, throughout these timelines have been added.]

*Introduction: A time-line of reneging and bad faith*

* *

*§ 1999:  *As a framework for understanding the agreements to which Sudan
has formally committed itself (*Parts 1 and 2)*, we should recall a time
when the UN human rights reports on the “situation in Sudan” were actually
worth reading—here from *May 1999* (E/CN.4/1999/38/17):

“As a Member State of the United Nations, the Sudan is *bound by the Charter of the United Nations*. Further, it is *obliged to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons within its territory*, as set out *inter alia* in the following instruments to which the Sudan has become a party:

the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*;

the *International* *Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*;

the *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination*; the Convention on the *Rights of the Child;*

the *Slavery Convention*, as amended;

the *Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery*, the Slave
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery;

*the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* and the Additional
Protocol thereto.

“As a *member of the International Labour Organization*, the Sudan has
ratified its Conventions concerning Forced Labour (No. 29), the Abolition
of Forced Labour (No. 105), the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining
(No. 98), Employment Policy (No. 122) and Discrimination (Employment and
Occupation) (No. 111).

*”On 23 September 1957, the Sudan became a party to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949*, which set out humanitarian rules for armed conflicts.

“Further, it is to be noted that the *Sudan has signed the Convention
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment*. Although signature has not yet been followed by ratification,
the Sudan has, by signing, shown the intention to accept the obligations under this Convention and, under customary international law, as reflected in the *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties*, is obligated not to do anything which would defeat the object and purpose of the Convention against Torture, pending a decision on ratification.

“In addition to the *obligations arising from conventional international
law, the Sudan is also bound to respect the standards of international customary law*.”

This list of obligations will seem a dismaying grotesquerie to those familiar with the regime’s long history of brutal domestic repression, it policy of enslaving Southerners, its massive and continuous violations of the Geneva Conventions to which it is party, the vast crimes against humanity represented by the systematic denial of humanitarian assistance to
desperate civilians, as well as by widespread and systematic bombing of
civilian and humanitarian targets for more than a decade>, its routine use of torture as an instrument of the security forces, and the conspicuous racism embodied not only in the practice of slavery, the widespread institutional exclusion of “Africans,” the racial basis for targeted human destruction (including the Nuba and the people of Darfur), but the present practice of “ethnic culling” of the northern population, a policy that de-nationalizes “Southerners” solely on the basis of race and ethnicity (see *July 4, 2011 *in *Part 2*).

The violations of these various “agreements” are so utterly routine that only the most dogged human rights organizations continue to make mention of them.

*Other agreements violated over the past decade:*

*§  January 2002: *Although usually touted as impressive success, the UN
peacekeeping mission in the Nuba Mountains was responsible for securing
compliance with an agreement that included, *inter alia*, the demand that
there be no redeployment of military forces.  On signing the agreement, and
in direct contravention of its terms, Khartoum immediately took military
advantage of the cease-fire and re-deployed two full brigades from South
Kordofan to the fighting in the oil regions of what was then Western Upper
Nile.  In *January 2003* I questioned in Kauda the head of this mission, Norwegian Brigadier-General Jan Erik Wilhelmsen, about the redeployment of the two SAF brigades in violation of the agreement.  The General sniffed contemptuously and said only that “this occurred before I got here.”  Such casual acceptance of violations of agreements set the stage for much that would follow.

* *

*§  October 2002*: Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army signed a “*Cessation of Hostilities Agreement*.”  And yet three months later I was interviewing civilians from Western Upper Nile who had recently been badly wounded by helicopter gunships.  Not until further international pressure in *February 2003 *was the cease-fire meaningfully observed by Khartoum, in large part because of the superb work of the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) based in Rumbek (Lakes State).

*§  2004: *The breakthrough *Abyei Protocol*—negotiated in* 2004*—was a linchpin in the successful completion of the *Comprehensive Peace Agreement*  (*CPA*) (signed *January 9, 2005*).  As discussed above and below, Khartoum massively violated this agreement and construed its terms in ways that were contemptibly disingenuous.  Especially conspicuous actions

*§  July 2005: *President Omar al-Bashir refuses to accept the findings of
the *Abyei Boundaries Commission*, established by the *CPA* and whose
membership was agreed to by both Khartoum and Juba.

*§  May 2008*:  Khartoum’s regular and militia forces burn *Abyei town* to
the ground, and in a prelude to the military seizure of *May 2011*, force
many tens of thousands of Dinka Ngok to flee southward to *Warrap State*.

*§  January 2011: *efforts by the regime to delay and ultimately prevent
the agreed upon self-determination referendum prove fully successful.

*March 2011: *SAF* *military deployments captured in satellite
photography<> make
unambiguously clear that Khartoum intends to seize Abyei militarily; there
is no meaningful response from the international community, which is well
aware of what is impending.

*§  May 20 – 21, 2011: *Khartoum easily moves from its positions of forward
deployment to seize Abyei militarily.  A year later, the SAF remains in full military control, despite the presence of an Ethiopian peacekeeping brigade with UN auspices.

[for a detailed timeline of the events in Abyei through *late May 2011*,
see: “An Abyei Timeline: The Long Road to Khartoum’s Military Invasion>

*§  2005 – 2011:* The various terms of the *CPA *designed to “make unity
attractive” for all Sudanese quickly fall apart, as many of the most powerful officials in Khartoum’s security cabal have no intention of fulfilling the terms of the *CPA*.  Southerners quickly find that whatever portfolio they might nominally hold, a “shadow ministry”—staffed by senior regime officials—wields real control over the ministry portfolio.  Key meetings are either secret or deliberately conducted in an Arabic that goes at a pace and with a colloquial content that often makes it difficult even for those with fluent “Juba Arabic” to keep up with important points of discussion.  This is the regime’s vision of “* power-sharing*.”

*§  Wealth-sharing* quickly became for Khartoum an exercise in bookkeeping
obscurantism: we will never know how many billions of dollars altogether were kept from the South by means of accounting legerdemain, but it is a very substantial number.  Khartoum’s willingness to cheat on the terms of
wealth-sharing were recently underscored when during fighting between
Tishwin and Heglig, the SPLA discovered an illegal and surreptitious
“tie-in” pipeline designed.

Khartoum also refused to convene in a timely way the *boundary commission
charged with first delineating and the demarcating the North/South border* as it stood on *January 1, 1956*.  What participation occurred was largely in
bad faith, at least at the highest political levels.  The deliberate obstruction of this critical task was, it is now clear, designed to make possible the present militarily ambiguous situations, which profit only Khartoum; Juba gains nothing from such indeterminate borders, and international policing is made infinitively more difficult in the absence of demarcation, indeed even delineation in far too many places.

*§*  The *CPA* was also to have afforded *”popular consultations” for the
people of South Kordofan and Blue Nile*; they were to address key
outstanding political issues in these long marginalized regions. 

Precisely what these *”consultations”* were to provide, and by what mechanisms, was never adequately specified.  But Khartoum’s intentions were easily discerned when in early *May 2011* the regime engineered the election of Ahmed Haroun as governor of South Kordofan.  Haroun is under indictment by the International Criminal Court for scores of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  He was put in his present position by Khartoum to continue those crimes against the Nuba.

Although hastily and foolishly ratified by the Carter Center, the *South
Kordofan elections* were yet another violation of the* CPA*, no matter how
we construe *”popular consultations.”*  Moreover, the Carter Center account
was subsequently vigorously challenged by a forceful and fully informed
critique from the Rift Valley Institute <>; but the damage had been done, and a month after Haroun’s election, South Kordofan was turned into a bloodbath by Khartoum’s regular and militia force.

*§  October/November 2010: *Obama administration officials, including
special envoy Scott Gration and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, bring
conspicuous pressure to bear on Juba to compromise further on Abyei,
despite the compromises already represented in both the Abyei Protocol and
Juba’s acceptance of the July *2009 ruling* on Abyei’s boundaries by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration. 

Senator John Kerry, part-time administration envoy and aspirant to the office of Secretary of State, reveals a contemptible but consequential ignorance in declaring Abyei to be an insignificant “few hundred square miles” standing in the way of peace for millions (in fact, Abyei as defined by the PCA is over 4,000 square miles>, almost the size of Kerry’s larger neighbor to the south, the state of Connecticut.

*§  November 2010: *Khartoum begins regular bombings of South Sudan, right up to and following the self-determination referendum of *January 9,
2011*. Even before the recent massive wave of aerial attacks, there had been more than 40 confirmed attacks on civilians or humanitarians <> in the South—or attacks so indiscriminate as to have no possible primary military purpose. These attacks violate a wide range of international human rights and humanitarian law.


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